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ABSTRACT
In multiagent systems, social norms is a useful technique in
regulating agents’ behaviors to achieve coordination or co-
operation among agents. One important research question is
to investigate how a desirable social norm can be evolved in
a bottom-up manner through local interactions. In this pa-
per, we propose two novel learning strategies under the col-
lective learning framework: collective learning EV-l and col-
lective learning EV-g, to efficiently facilitate the emergence
of social norms. Experimental results show that both learn-
ing strategies can support the emergence of desirable social
norms more efficiently in a much broader range of multia-
gent interaction scenarios than previous work, and also are
robust across different network topologies.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2 [ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE]: Distributed Arti-
ficial Intelligence—Multiagent systems
Keywords
Collective learning; Norm emergence
1. INTRODUCTION
In multiagent systems (MASs), social norms play an im-
portant role in regulating agents’ behaviors to ensure effec-
tive coordination among agents, and have been applied in
a wide variety of practical distributed systems such as elec-
tronic institutions.
In distributed multiagent environments, since there does
not exist a centralized controller and the norm of the system
may vary when the environment changes and is usually not
available beforehand, it is not feasible to precompute any
norm for agents to employ before their interaction starts.
Thus investigating what mechanism can facilitate agents to-
wards a consistent and desirable social norm through local
interaction is important to ensure the effective coordination
among agents and overall high performance in such kinds
of distributed and dynamic systems. Until now much effort
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Figure 1: Payoff matrices for (a) coordination game with
high penalty (CGHP) (b) Fully stochastic coordination
game with high penalty (FSCGHP)
has been devoted by researchers from the normative MASs
area to investigating the emergence of norms in agent soci-
eties through different manners of learning. Sen and Airiau
[1] firstly proposed applying a number of existing multia-
gent learning algorithms to the social learning framework to
investigate the emergence of social norms through learning
in a population of agents. Later, a number of work [2, 3]
extended this social learning framework by taking into con-
sideration complex networks (e.g., small-world and scale free
network) to model the underlying topology of the agent so-
ciety, and a number of learning strategies and mechanisms
have been proposed to facilitate the convergence to social
norms through local interaction.
One commonly adopted abstraction of a norm in previous
work is that it corresponds to a Nash equilibrium where
all agents choose identical actions, which usually can be
modeled as a coordination game. However, the norms in
practical scenarios may correspond to other forms of Nash
equilibria requiring agents to choose different actions (a.k.a.
anti-coordination game), which cannot be (efficiently) han-
dled in previous work [3]. Moreover, more complicated sce-
narios involve multiple Nash equilibria while only some of
them correspond to norms and may involve stochastic pay-
offs shown in Figure 1(a) and 1(b). In this kind of scenarios,
it is very likely for agents to converge to the non-norm equi-
librium to avoid the high mis-coordination cost, which has
not been addressed by previous work [1, 3] yet.
To tackle the above challenges, we propose two novel learn-
ing strategies: collective learning EV-l and collective-learning
EV-g, under the networked collective learning framework
which is applicable to a wide variety of scenarios for norm
emergence. We extensively evaluate the learning perfor-
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mance of both collective learning EV-l and collective learn-
ing EV-g and show that both strategies enable agents to
reach consistent norms more efficiently in a wider range of
games than previous approaches. We also empirically find
that the performance of collective learning EV-l and EV-g
is robust across different topologies.
2. NETWORKEDCOLLECTIVELEARNING
FRAMEWORK
Under the networked collective learning framework, there
are a population of n agents in which each agent’s neigh-
bors are determined by the underlying network topology.
Three major topologies are considered: ring network, small-
world network and scale-free network. Each agent i learns
its policy (i.e., which norm to adopt) through repeated pair-
wise interactions with all its neighbors each round. The
interaction between each pair of agents is modeled as a two-
player strategic game. During each interaction, one agent is
randomly assigned as the row player and the other agent
as the column player. At the beginning of each round,
each agent first determines its current best-response actions
against each of its neighbors as either row and column player
respectively. Following that, the sets of best response actions
for each role are synthesized into a single best response ac-
tion respectively, which will be used as the overall strategy
to interact with all of its neighbors in the current round.
This models people’s collective decision-making process in
which people make collective decisions based on multiple
feedbacks. In each round, each agent i has the opportunity
to interact with each of its neighbors once. At the end of
each round, each agent updates its learning strategy towards
each neighbor based on its previous experience.
2.1 Collective Learning Strategy
We propose that each agent i holds a Q-value Qi,j(s, a) for
each action a under each state s ∈ {Row,Column} against
each of its neighbors j, which keeps a record of action a’s
past performance against neighbor j and serves as the basis
for making decisions. At the end of each round t, each agent
i updates its Q-values for each neighbor j as follows,
Qt+1i,j (s, a) = Q
t
i,j(s, a) + α
t
i,j(s)×
[Rti,j(s, a) + γmaxa∈AiQ
t
i,j(s
′, a)−Qti,j(s, a)]
(1)
We employ the Frequency Maximum Q-value heuristic
(FMQ) as the updating heuristic to compute the estimated
values of the actions as follows.
EV t+1i,j (s, a) = Q
t+1
i,j (s, a) + c× f t+1(s, a)×Rtmax(s, a) (2)
where Rtmax(s, a) is the highest payoff in the interaction his-
tory with agent j, f t+1(s, a) is the frequency of receiving
the reward of Rtmax(s, a) by choosing action a, and c is the
weighting factor.
Based on its corresponding set of EV-values, each agent
chooses its best response action against each neighbor under
each state using the -greedy mechanism denoted as Str and
Stc. Finally, each agent synthesizes a single best-response
action for both states based on Str and Stc using majority
voting. The action with the highest vote is selected as the
final action against all neighbors. We distinguish two general
ways of making explorations following the -greedy mecha-
nism: local exploration and global exploration. Local explo-
ration is made before synthesizing the overall best-response
action, while the global exploration is made after the best-
response action has been synthesized. We denote the collec-
tive learning strategy with local and global exploration as
collective learning EV-l and collective learning EV-g.
3. EXPERIMENTAL SIMULATION
We compare the performance of collective learning EV-
l and collective learning EV-g with previous work: collec-
tive learning-l/g [3] and pairwise learning [1] in a variety of
games. Three representative network topologies are consid-
ered here: ring network, small-world network and scale-free
network. We also consider the case of random network where
there is no fixed network topology and each agent simply in-
teracts with a fixed and same number of agents randomly
selected from the system each round.
We briefly summarize the results across all network topolo-
gies as follows: (1) both collective learning EV-l and collec-
tive learning EV-g are always able to achieve coordination
on norms for all four types of games; (2) both collective
learning-l and collective learning-g can only succeed in co-
ordination games, while fail in the rest of games; (3) pairwise
learning can succeed in both coordination and AC games,
while fail in the rest of games; (4) for all networks, it gener-
ally takes longer time to converge to norms (or fails to con-
verge) when the game becomes more challenging; 5) agents
converge to norms faster under collective learning frame-
work than social learning framework; 6) agents converge to
norms faster using local exploration than global exploration
under the collective learning framework. Overall, we can ob-
serve that the performance of collective learning EV-l and
EV-g is robust towards different network topologies. The
norm emergence performance is independent of the network
topology and the identities of agents that they interact with.
4. CONCLUSION
We proposed two novel learning strategies for norm emer-
gence through local interactions under the collective learn-
ing framework. Extensive simulation shows that collective
learning EV-l and EV-g can enable agents to reach consistent
norms more efficiently and robustly across a wider variety of
games and topologies compared with previous approaches.
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